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Agnieszka Soltysik Monnet
War and National Renewal: Civil Religion
and Blood Sacrifice in American Culture
1 Wars are often associated with a rhetoric of renewal or “new beginnings.” Putting aside for a
moment the possibility that this is only rhetoric, I would like to examine the conditions which
allow war – sometimes – to function as an occasion for a new purchase on a shared sense
of national identity and common purpose. One critical frame that brings such a proposition
into focus is the sociology of religion and group identity founded by Emile Durkheim and
developed in America since the 1960s in terms of the notion of civil religion. Specifically, I will
consider a recent book which combines Durkheim’s insights with Réné Girard’s claims about
the social function of ritualized sacrifice into a troubling argument about modern national
cohesion as dependent on blood sacrifice. Even if many modern nation states define themselves
as quintessentially secular and legal entities, inspiring healthy patriotism rather than overly
emotional nationalism, they share with explicitly descent-based nationalisms a substratum of
more “mystical” ideals and rituals.1 The most important, complex, and seemingly irrational of
these is self-sacrifice for the common good or the group. This willingness, closely associated
with military valor and patriotic heroism, is in fact essential to the cohesiveness and endurance
of any group, argue Carolyn Marvin and David Ingle in their book, Blood Sacrifice and the
Nation. Without it, a nation will not be able to defend itself and will not even want to. A
nation that cannot inspire its members to lay down their life for it will inevitably fragment into
clashing groups and lose its sovereignty.
2 Since the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the beginning of the age of the modern
nation-state, patriotic sacrifice has been regarded as the noblest and most civilized gesture a
man can perform for his country. Yet modern scholars of nationalism and national identity
view self-sacrifice uneasily. While recognizing its central place in definitions of viable nations
(those that produce a lasting sense of coherence and continuity in their populations), historians
and scholars of national identity are at pains to account for the intensity of attachment that
would induce individuals to die for their nation. Moreover, the specter of Japanese suicide
pilots and Islamic airplane hijackers, whose deaths may be understood as heroic sacrifices in
their own cultural contexts but as terrorism in ours, complicates the work of distinguishing
“appropriate” martyrdom from religious fanaticism. If, as Tom Nairn has suggested, the nation
is “the modern Janus,” no other aspect of national experience is more double-faced than
patriotic self-sacrifice.2 This essay will attempt to unpack some of the paradoxes raised by the
notion of sacrifice in the context of US military history as well as the media treatment of the
September 11 attacks, with a special focus on the sacred status of the flag and the ambivalent
position of the soldier (and other uniformed servicemen such as police and firefighters). My
final objective is to probe the theory of national renewal based on blood sacrifice advanced
by Carolyn Marvin and David Ingle by testing its explanatory power for two images that have
become iconic as representations of military service and sacrifice: Rosenthal’s photo of the
flag-planting at Iwo Jima and Thomas Franklin’s photo of Ground Zero.
3 Any discussion of the relationship between war and national renewal should begin with the
fact that most nations conceptualize and narrate their origins in terms of foundational wars. In
France, this was the Revolution of 1789, in Germany, the conclusion of the Franco-Prussian
War in 1871, and for many postcolonial nations, such as the United States, their war of
independence. Many nations also structure their national histories around the subsequent wars
that they waged with other nations or internally. These are the events that organize national
history and they are sometimes (but far from always) associated with a regeneration of national
cohesion and patriotic attachment. In the United States, the Civil War and the Second World
War are widely regarded as the two most important military conflicts in terms of reorganizing
national identity and renewing a sense of national purpose. World War I also had an important
impact on the country, but its place in national memory is more controversial and complex
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due to the lack of clarity about its objectives in the minds of American citizens and soldiers
alike. The many other wars conducted by the United States, e.g. the War of 1812, the Mexican-
American War, the Indian Wars, the Spanish-American War, the Korean, Vietnam, and Persian
Gulf Wars, may have generated brief moments of patriotic effervescence, gained territory and
political and economic objectives, and produced important collective memories and rituals,
but none of them can be said to have reset the clock of nation-time and boosted an enduring
sense of national collective purpose in any way remotely like the Civil War and World War II.3
4 If America was “born” in the Revolutionary War, it is justifiable to say that it was “reborn” in
the Civil War. Robert Penn Warren has claimed that the “The Civil War is, for the American
imagination, the great single event of our history.”4 Before the Civil War, Warren contends,
the United States “had no history in the deepest and most inward sense.” John Neff has
recently proposed that the Civil War produced two separate national ideologies which could
each be called a civil religion: the Lost Cause of the South, and the “Cause Victorious” of
the North.5 Yet, as most historians would agree, by the time the U.S. had entered into World
War I, the Southern myth of its martyrdom had begun to converge with Northern narratives
to produce a revisionist history that conceived of the Civil War as a shared experience of
national suffering. This was the argument made by Woodrow Wilson’s A History of the
American People (1902) and was popularized by D.W. Griffith’s film A Birth of a Nation
(1914), which drew on Wilson’s work for its historical claims. It was on this basis that Warren
could claim that the Civil War gave the United States a history that it had not had before:
as the foundation of a newly reconceived nation. Most historians would agree that American
national self-understanding changed significantly during the Civil War. One concrete example
of this transformation is the shift in usage from the plural to the singular in relation to the
United States, as in “The United States is a republic” as opposed to “The United States are
a republic.” This shift is generally dated to around 1861, which is to say, the beginning of
the Civil War, and helped American conceptualize the entity or cause they were fighting for
(on the Union side, that is).6 Another example of how the Civil War helped create a sense of
common national identity is the way in which it occasioned the founding of a national military
cemetery system. Up until the Civil War, the bodies of slain American soldiers had not been
retrieved systematically from battlefields nor been the objects of special reverence. It was in
1862 that, for the first time, the U.S. government decided to set aside, by Act of Congress,
special cemeteries to bury the bodies of those who gave their lives in defense of the Republic,
and an entire network of sacred national sites was thereby created.7
5 The single most famous formulation of the way in which war is linked to a discourse of
national renewal is Abraham Lincoln’s address at the dedication of one of the first of these
national military cemeteries: the Soldier’s National Cemetery at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania,
in 1863, exactly midway through the Civil War. Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address is a powerful
mixture of political and religious rhetoric that should serve as a point of departure for any
analysis of the notion of American civil religion. Although this concept no longer inspires
the same intensity of debate as it did in the decade following Robert Bellah’s influential
essay on the subject in 1967, it remains a compelling framework through which to understand
the emotional and quasi-mystical dimensions of American politics.8 Civil religion has been
defined in a variety of ways, but I use it to refer to the way in which national institutions,
rituals and ideologies function like a religion: dividing the world into sacred and profane
spheres, providing constituents with a sense of supra-individual transcendence and collective
continuity, and offering an emotionally satisfying frame for coping with death. If national civil
religion resembles traditional religions in these three aspects, the modern nation has wrested
from religion a fourth aspect that it now monopolizes completely: the power to kill non-
members for the sake of its self-preservation and to ask members to die in its name. Currently,
only the nation-state legitimately holds this right, which is why the nation can be said to have
replaced religion in the social organization of death.
6 Lincoln’s speech at Gettysburg offers a revealing blueprint of how religious notions structure
American political ideology. The word “dedicated” is used seven times in this speech of 267
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words. The first use is completely neutral, in the sense of “committed to” or “defined by”:
“Four score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent a new nation,
conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.” However,
in the next lines, Lincoln begins to rework the meaning of this word, pushing it steadily into a
religious frame. For example, the third appearance of the term is synonymous to “consecrate”
or set aside as sacred, without actually saying so explicitly: “We have come to dedicate a
portion of that field, as a final resting place for those who here gave their lives that that nation
might live.”
7 To speak of “dedicating” a piece of land for burial purposes, while not in itself overtly
religious, shifts the register of the term in a more religious direction by referring to an activity,
that of burial, which had traditionally been a function performed by the church and not the
state. Building upon this sense of the word, Lincoln repeats it once more in the next line,
this time as an exact synonym of “consecrate,” and reinforces this meaning by the even more
explicitly religious verb “to hallow.”
8 In other words, “dedication” has at least two different meanings in the Gettysburg Address:
that of committing one’s self to a course of action or program, and a setting aside for religious
or special purposes. When Lincoln says in the third paragraph that “we can not dedicate” this
ground, he performs a subtle but significant confusion between the two senses. By arguing that
the battle itself has “consecrated” the land, Lincoln shifts from the neutral to the religious sense
of the word and moreover implies that the battle itself is somehow sacred. Sociologically, in
the light of Durkheim’s theory, which locates the sacred in the experience of the collective,
this makes sense, i.e. the battle is sacred because it is about the fate of the nation.
9 The concepts invoked here, i.e. dedication, consecration, and devotion, are used in ways that
need to be understood not only for their rhetorical value but for their ritual and performative
function in the context of the official event at which they are uttered: the dedication of one
of the very first war cemeteries. Lincoln was not only dedicating this one cemetery, he was
defining the meaning and purpose of the war cemetery as a national institution. In doing so,
he articulated one of the most enigmatic paradoxes of national identity: namely, that it is
strengthened by the lives that are lost in its name. The “devotion” inspired in the survivors by
the sacrifice of the dead produces a “new birth of freedom,” a phrase that refigures the deaths
of the soldiers into an image of birth linked to national identity through the word “freedom” (a
term which vaguely but unmistakably signifies “America”). In other words, death, figured and
understood as willing sacrifice, invests the nation with a sense of purpose, collective feeling,
and renewed unity. Although Lincoln’s speech invokes this transformative magic by which
death becomes a “new birth,” it does not explain how it works.9 After all, the many deaths
at Gettysburg could seem to dilute the cohesion of the Union and be figured as a tragedy to
be regretted rather than an occasion for regeneration. The logic by which death re-energizes
national solidarity and cohesion can best be understood through the disciplines of sociology
and anthropology and will be examined in a moment.
10 Since the Civil War, only World War II has come close to playing a comparable role of
renewing a sense of sacred feeling and common purpose.10 In both cases, I am referring to a
sense of collective unity that is articulated most clearly after the fact, in the national narrative
and memory that finally takes stock of the event, and do not wish to eclipse the complexity
of cultural forces that were in play during the actual events. During the Civil War, there were
riots by draft resisters, and many Americans on both sides of the conflict felt that the price to
pay for Union and Emancipation was far too high. American participation in the Second World
War also had its opponents and critics, even after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Nevertheless,
World War II has been dubbed “The Good War” in common parlance because of its seeming
moral clarity. The dropping of the atomic bomb and the firebombing of German cities may
have tainted the moral high-ground claimed by the Allies for some observers, but the Second
World War has nevertheless entered American national memory as the most important episode
of collective effort and public solidarity in the twentieth century. Former New York Governor
Mario Cuomo recalls the Second World War as the “last time that this country believed
anything profoundly, any great single cause”:
War and National Renewal: Civil Religion and Blood Sacrifice in American Culture 5
European journal of American studies | 2012
We are good, they are bad. Let’s all get together we said, and we creamed them.
We started from way behind. We found strength in this common commitment, this
commonality, community, family. The idea of coming together was best served in my
lifetime in the Second World War.11
11 Besides evoking a Manichean moral simplicity commonly associated with WWII, Cuomo’s
description of the war is most revealing in its curious last phrase: the idea of coming
together being “best served” by the Second World War. “Coming together” is necessary
for any group that wants to endure, and Cuomo’s slightly awkward phrasing inadvertently
suggests that war is a means of fulfilling this need. The currently recognized effectiveness
of the Second World War in performing this function is clear from Cuomo’s emphatically
redundant description of the unparalleled solidarity it created: “this common commitment,
this commonality, community, family.” As if this series of cognates of “common” were not
enough, Cuomo follows up with the phrase “coming together,” emphasizing that the unity he
describes does did not emerge automatically from a natural solidarity but is more accurately
described as a defensive reaction to an outside threat, so therefore necessarily ephemeral.
Rapturous accounts of World War II unity are inevitably either eulogies or jeremiads, but their
shared trait is a regret that the sense of cohesion did not last longer.
12 Nonetheless, even if the glow of World War II as a collective experience faded in the decades
that followed, and was overshadowed by the divisive war in Vietnam and other crises of
political authority, it can be said that World War II still remains for the time being the
most effective functional paradigm for interpreting large-scale death in a national narrative.
This became especially clear during the Sept. 11 attacks in New York. Although the initial
comparison that many commentators made was with Pearl Harbor, the image that dominated
the media in the weeks after the attacks (and which has since been immortalized as a postage
stamp), Thomas Franklin’s photo of firefighters raising a flag, drew comparisons with a very
different World War II event: the planting of the flag on Iwo Jima. If the comparison with
Pearl Harbor needs no explanation (though it certainly requires qualification), the logic of
mapping Joseph Rosenthal’s famous photograph onto the rubble of the Twin Towers deserves
careful unpacking. Why should that image of territory-marking in the Pacific be a framework
for mediating and understanding the attack on New York? What exactly is the connection,
besides the compositional similarity of the photos? One obvious answer is the “rising from
the rubble” metaphor suggested by the devastated landscape of both images. Yet this answer
is not entirely satisfying since the devastated landscape on Iwo Jima is foreign land and the
flag-raisers are the authors rather than victims of an attack. In other words, the rubble is not
theirs to rise from.
13 I would suggest that Iwo Jima was invoked in the wake of 9/11 for another reason: its depiction
of American sacrifice as a ritual of national regeneration. Although the photo is generally
understood to signify victory, it is also understood to evoke the high cost of that victory. The
fact that Iwo Jima was one of the bloodiest landings of the Pacific campaign is indissociably
linked to the cultural status of the photo. Among the various meanings attributable to the
Rosenthal photo, then, mass death is one. In fact, as Clint Eastwood’s 2006 film, Flags of
Our Fathers, reminded us, three of the six soldiers in the Rosenthal photo died in the days
following the picture-taking (the photo was taken on the third day of a month-long battle).
However, instead of depicting corpses or wounded men, as many war photos do, the photo
depicts in the most vivid possible terms the loyalty of American troops to the American flag
and therefore to America (the photo depicts this regardless of the question of whether the
soldiers actually felt such patriotism or had simply been ordered to raise the flag). The tacit
message behind this deliberately choreographed show of patriotism is that these young men
are willingly fighting and dying for America.12 In Blood Sacrifice and the Nation, Marvin
and Ingle argue that only willing self-sacrifice can function successfully to create a sense of
national renewal. Soldiers and other uniformed servicemen, by definition, are understood to
be willing to lay down their lives for the nation or for others. In other words, the photo of the
flag-raising on Iwo Jima became such a powerful and popular icon of military service because
it shows soldiers demonstrating their loyalty to the flag, and thereby to the nation it represents,
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in a clear and unambiguous tableau, against an invisible backdrop of massive fatality. The fact
that the deaths at Iwo Jima can therefore be considered willing sacrifices gives them great ritual
power in terms of generating the “heightened devotion” invoked by Lincoln at Gettysburg.
14 Accordingly, it could be argued that the American media invoked Iwo Jima as an interpretive
schema to make sense of the Sept. 11 attacks in order to frame them in the regenerative terms
of national sacrifice. Yet, since most of the 2976 people who died in those two buildings were
not willing sacrifices, unlike soldiers in battle, they did not fit well in this narrative. Marvin
and Ingle’s insistence that group members must seem willing to die for the group in order for
their deaths to successfully generate group cohesion can help explain the way firefighters and
other uniformed public servants became the almost obsessive focus of the national media in the
weeks following the attacks. It is particularly striking how much emphasis was placed on the
volunteer aspect of their commitment to their work. The thirst for narratives of self-sacrifice
was so strong that one woman, Tania Head, became nationally famous for her fraudulent
account of being saved by a man who then went back into one of the towers and died. The
revealing thing about this hoax is that the perpetrator did not invent a story of her own
miraculous escape or heroism but a story of someone else’s heroic death.13 She intuitively
sensed that self-sacrifice generates far more emotional and symbolic currency than survival,
no matter how lucky.
15 If the immediate reaction of the media was to read the Sept. 11 attacks in terms of World War
II frames of reference, President Barack Obama gestured rhetorically back to Gettysburg in
his speech commemorating the attacks in 2009. Calling on the American public to make Sept.
11 serve as an occasion for national renewal, Obama said: “On a day when others sought to
sap our confidence, let us renew our common purpose, let us remember how we came together
as one nation, as one people, as Americans united.” Echoing Cuomo’s description of World
War II, Obama invokes the ideals of “coming together,” a “common purpose,” “one nation”
and “one people.” Speaking of the death of nearly 3000 Americans as an occasion for unity,
Obama invokes the familiar rhetoric of national renewal based on mass death.
16 In order better to understand how a compelling sense of national unity and renewal can
be generated by a massacre like the Sept. 11 attacks, we need to look into sociology and
specifically the concept of civil religion, which is concerned with the religious or emotional
aspects of nationalism. This is a field that historians shy away from because it does not lend
itself to the same kind of empirical analysis as political speeches and historical events – yet
it exerts a fascination because it represents the unexamined core of patriotism as attachment
or strong feeling that is defined precisely by a willingness to die for one’s country. Benedict
Anderson’s Imagined Communities (1983), one of the most influential recent works on
national identity, begins and ends with attempts to reflect on this question and yet consistently
shies away from engaging with it head on.
In the preceding chapters I have tried to delineate the processes by which the nation
came to be imagined... But it is doubtful whether either social change or transformed
consciousness, in themselves, do much to explain the attachment that people feel for the
inventions of their imaginations--or, to return to a question raised at the beginning of this
text-- why people are ready to die for these inventions.14
17 As Anderson reminds his readers in this passage, the processes of national identity formation
through media and shared texts do not fully account for the power of these attachments.
Anderson can only express puzzlement at the force of these feelings, which he consistently
equates with and defines by the willingness to sacrifice one’s life for the idea of the nation. It
is this willingness that motivates yet eludes his efforts at analysis, as they focus on tangible
institutions such as museums, newspapers, the census, and other inventions of written culture.
However, the willingness to die for one’s group is not an invention of the nation state. It has
a far longer pedigree and can attach itself to groups of any size. Nevertheless, the nation-state
is currently the only group that can legally demand its members to sacrifice themselves for
its sake.15
18 The social theorist whose work has been the most pertinent to this issue is Emile Durkheim,
especially in his late work Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1915). Durkheim’s most
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influential idea in this study is that social belonging is essentially the root of religion, since
religious feelings (i.e. awe, submission to a greater power, and a sense of the sacred and
profane) originate in the admiration and fear that the individual feels before the power of the
collectivity. The collectivity has the power to protect or to harm the individual, and so the
individual’s basic attitude towards the group is necessarily an ambivalent one of attraction/
attachment and awe/terror. Durkheim argues that every human society makes a distinction
between the sacred and profane and that this too is rooted in collective experience. That which
is set aside as “sacred” is invested with the meaning and the power which is basically that
of the group, i.e. it is a sign for the collectivity. In the aboriginal tribes that Durkheim used
as the basis of his theory, the sacred takes the form of a totem. Durkheim further argues that
the religious practices of aboriginal tribes are able to reveal the universal traits of all religions
and all societies. Their “primitivism” does not make them qualitatively different from the
monotheism of more” advanced” societies, but gives them rather the status of basic common
denominator or structural skeleton of all religions. Interestingly, when Durkheim casts about
for a modern equivalent to the totem, he does not cite the Christian cross but the national flag.16
Flags are our modern totems insofar as they are the emblems that represent the most widely
respected collective units, not tribes in our case but nation-states. In Durkheimian sociology,
then, the modern equivalents of totem and tribe are flag and country.
19 This insight intersects with some of the work done in the field of civil religion. However, much
of the work on American civil religion in the 1970s that followed Robert Bellah’s attempt
to apply Durkheimian notions to American culture may have misconceived the location of
the sacred in American society. While scholars debated the interpenetration of religion and
politics in Presidents’ speeches and the supposed sanctity of the Constitution in American
politics, the totemic status of the flag as an embodied symbol of American sovereignty was
largely overlooked. In other words, historians focused on texts, myths and rhetoric, but ignored
the quasi-religious rites and sacred objects that could define American civil religion. Yet,
when we think of the omnipresence of the American flag at official ceremonies, government
offices, public buildings, schools and sports events, as well as the elaborate rules that govern its
fabrication, handling and disposal, it is impossible to deny that there is an element of the sacred
attached to this object.17 More striking still is the way in which the bodies of dead soldiers
are ritualistically covered by flags, and how flags are given to families in lieu of the body of
the slain soldier. There is a physical continuity between the flag-body and the soldier-body
that Durkheim’s theory of the religious basis of society goes further towards explaining than
any official account of why flags are given to soldiers’ families. Finally, not only the intense
emotions around flag-burning and flag desecration, but the various Supreme Court decisions
concerning the treatment of the flag suggest that it is not explicitly treated as a religious object
only because its status is regarded tacitly as higher than any other religious symbol.18 This is
the point missed by Robert Bellah and other scholars: civil religion does not function like other
existing religions because it transcends them in relation to the collectivity as a whole. While
many people have abandoned religious beliefs and practice, it is almost impossible to have no
nationality. Even people who have lost their citizenship one way or another usually consider
themselves as “belonging” to some nation in at least a spiritual and cultural sense. The  main
point here is that nationality is generally the first and most important way that social life on this
planet is organized. It commands the most primary emotions and its leaders, representatives,
institutions, and flags require the highest degree of respect.19
20 While the claim that the American flag is a kind of totem may still be accepted by most
historians, Marvin and Ingle’s argument that the nation is regenerated most effectively by
blood sacrifice is more problematic. This is where Réné Girard’s work on the sacrifice
comes in. In Violence and the Sacred (1972), Girard argued that societies are naturally
rife with tensions and conflicts and that they can avoid internal violence only by directing
this aggression towards a common object. This sacrificial scapegoat allows the group to
maintain internal peace by being purged or destroyed. Similarly, Anthony Marx argues in a
recent study of national origins that nation-states did not merely replace the Church, as is
commonly accepted, but that they harnessed the exclusionary tactics and deep passions of
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religious identity into nationalist politics.20 Linking Christian martyrology to modern nation-
formation,Marvin and Ingle argue that national cohesion is always constituted on the basis of
a collective “victimage” or collective sacrifice.21 In other words, as nations tend to view their
history in terms of foundational moments of collective sacrifice, such as wars of liberation or
other moments of great loss of life, the intensity of their sense of national unity and loyalty is
based on a sense of ongoing identification with these foundational sacrifices. Here we return
to Abraham Lincoln’s speech at Gettysburg and his hope that the casualties buried in that
new war cemetery would inspire the living to “dedicate” themselves to the cause of American
nationhood.
21 Although nationalistic rhetoric tends to rely heavily on the notion of sacrifice, and we are all
familiar with such phrases in political speeches, the idea that nations might actually “need”
members to be willing to die for them can appear prima facie as a revolting claim. For many
modern subjects, the idea of the nation serves as a powerful ideal of community and social
justice. Civic nationalism promises to transcend and reconcile ethnic, religious, and all other
differences by congealing a disparate population into a kind of imagined family linked by
citizenship and mutual solidarity, and it is in this utopian guise that the idea of the nation
inspires powerful emotions in people across the political spectrum. Modern political theory
defines the role of the nation-state primarily as one of protection: of nationals from non-
nationals, and of citizens from each other. Therefore, nothing could seem more wrong (even
“sacrilegious”) than to propose that the nation might need members to die for it on a regular
basis in order to sustain its sense of unity. Following Girard’s contention that some rituals
require participants to be unaware of their true meaning and function, Marvin and Ingle argue
that the true nature of war as national sacrificial ritual is the object of a powerful taboo.
Although willing sacrifices create powerful group feeling, and political speeches such as
Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address tacitly acknowledge this, the group or nation cannot know that
it needs members to die or that it finds ways to send them to die. This fact cannot be explicitly
articulated or understood or the ritual will not work.
22 The class of willing sacrifices that every viable nation possesses is its military, which is
why soldiers are something like a priestly order: subject to strict selection, training, rules,
and privileges. In the US, the mandatory Soldier’s Oath binds the pledger to protect the
Constitution and obey orders given by the President and his representatives: "I, _____, do
solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States
against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same;
and that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers
appointed over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. So
help me God." (Title 10, US Code; Act of 5 May 1960 replacing the wording first adopted
in 1789, with amendment effective 5 October 1962). The mixture of national and religious
rhetoric (“true faith”, “So help me God,” “appointed” officers) is striking for a nation which
has made the separation of church and state a cornerstone of its national creed, but this is to
miss the point that the state is itself a kind of church for all practical purposes.
23 The other striking thing about the Oath is that it contains several important omissions. While
explicitly naming the Constitution as the sacred text of the United States, it respects the taboo
on naming the real sacred symbol, i.e. the flag. Nevertheless, while many soldiers would lay
down their life to keep an American flag safe, none would risk injury to protect a copy of the
Constitution (or even the original document, for that matter). The other important omission in
the Soldier’s Oath is any reference to killing or dying, which finally are the two basic tasks
that the soldier is authorized to do and which sets him/her apart from ordinary citizens.22 These
all-important implications are couched in the neutral pledge to obey the President and one’s
hierarchical superiors in the Army who represent his sovereign authority.
24 The direct and explicit relationship of each soldier to the highest sovereign power in the group
articulated in the Soldier’s Oath, binding each oath-taker directly to the President, reveals
something about why military service occupies such a charged and often coveted place in
national experience. Military service confers on soldiers a privileged relationship to totemic
power, the power linked to sovereignty and to the most sacred sites, objects and moments in
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national life. This heightened relationship to national belonging is the reason why military
service continues to be prized by young men seeking a rite of passage and a link to something
greater than their individual lives. It is also the reason why women have fought to be accepted
into the military and why African Americans and other ethnic groups have eagerly served
in every major war. Military service bears a special relationship to citizenship and offers the
promise of unassailable national credentials.
25 And yet, soldiers are often objects of intense popular ambivalence. The negative stereotypes
of soldiers as unthinking automatons or lawless brutes are rooted in a common perception that
soldiers are qualitatively different from civilians: they are linked to death, either by killing
or agreeing to be killed. The unquestioning willingness to die, though appreciable in certain
specific circumstances, nevertheless creates suspicion that servicemen are uncritical: naive
fools in the best of cases, brainwashed robots in the worst. These negative perceptions are
even greater in the case of combat veterans who have killed as well as risked their lives. The
fear and contempt aroused by Vietnam veterans in the 1970s (before their rehabilitation by
official ceremonies and shifts in media depictions in the mid 1980s) revealed a discomfort that
is latent in the civilian attitude towards veterans of any war. The official and public respect
accorded to military personnel, all the more ubiquitous and ostentatious since the beginning
of the Iraq War, conceals the fact that there is necessarily a tension between civilians, focused
on their pleasure and profit, and the class of people designated for exposure to death and
injury supposedly to protect them (though, in actual fact, few American wars have been truly
defensive, most advancing economic and imperial interests of limited relevance to the majority
of the population). Thus, the suspicion and distrust is often mutual (with veterans voicing
resentment about having been sent into danger by a population that doesn’t seem to appreciate
what soldiers have risked and lost). This mutual incomprehension came to a head during the
Vietnam War but is always present to some degree.
26  Military service possesses a truly unusual status in relation to the nation-state: it is defined
by a direct appropriation of the individual in the service of the group. In fact, the whole point
is to de-individualize the individual and to make him as unlike a civilian as possible. Thus,
military training is characterized by strict discipline and the foregoing of civilian freedoms.
The overt rationale for the strictness of military discipline is to make soldiers effective and
to save lives, but an anthropological view would focus on the ritualistic aspect of practices
that organize access to legalized murder and self-sacrifice. Surely one of the most shocking
images in Michael Moore’s anti-war film Fahrenheit 9/11 was that of American soldiers in
Iraq drunk and stoned and blasting loud rock music as they careened lawlessly through Iraqi
streets shooting from tanks. Moore’s objective in showing these images was to undermine
the credibility of the entire military operation, since soldiers are supposed to be chaste and
sober in order for their access to killing to be acceptable. By showing the irreverent attitude of
American servicemen to their mission, Moore wished to show that the war itself was corrupt
and wrong. In doing so, he was reviving a cultural narrative that had emerged during the
Vietnam War, which characterized the soldiers of that war also as lawless and the war itself as
illegal. The image of the Vietnam soldier as insubordinate and generally lawless is often linked
to the fact that America failed in Vietnam. In fact, all wars since WWII have been failures, as
far as regenerating a collective sense of purpose and national cohesion is concerned: so-called
successful ones, such as the Panama Invasion and Persian Gulf, as ineffective in this respect
as the failures (e.g. Vietnam) and stalemates (e.g. Korea).
27 The issue of why some wars “work” as national rituals of renewal and some do not is the
subject of a chapter of Marvin and Ingle’s book listing several “conditions” that need to be
met. These conditions are rooted in the ritual aspect of the theory and need to be understood
in anthropological rather than political terms. First of all, according to Marvin and Ingle,
the greater the number of deaths, the greater the effect of national “coming together” and
patriotism. The two most “successful” wars in this regard in the history of the United States
were the Civil War and World War II. In the first, nearly one in ten able-bodied adult males
were killed or injured. In the second, the percentage of deaths relative to the population was
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smaller, but 82% of American men between the age of 20 and 25 were drafted or enlisted,
and therefore at risk.
28 An important corollary of the first condition is that only member deaths count, not enemy
deaths. This would explain why the effects of the First Gulf War, with over 85,000 Iraqi deaths
but only 147 American casualties, were so fleeting. Common sense would suggest that such a
resounding victory would translate into a longer lasting sense of national unity and pride, but
scholars all agree that the war faded quickly from popular memory and concern. Similarly, the
War of 1812 (with 2,260 killed), the Mexican American war of 1846-48 (with 1733 deaths) and
the Spanish American War of 1898 (with 385) both had little long-term impact on American
national self-definition, and even the Korean and Vietnam Wars (with around 50 and 60
thousand casualties, respectively) did not touch nearly as much of the population as WWII
with its 400,000 deaths (and over a million combined deaths and wounded).
29 However, Korea and Vietnam failed to meet other ritual conditions listed by Marvin and Ingle,
including the requirement that the sacrificial victim must be (or appear to be) willing. The
victims, and again, this refers generally to soldiers, must declare themselves willing to die for
the cause, and the group must declare itself willing to sacrifice them. If the Soldier’s Oath is
the formal declaration of the soldier’s willingness, an official declaration of war is the standard
way in which the nation indicates its willingness to bear the cost of war in soldiers’ lives.
The Vietnam War was a failure in all respects, as far as this condition is concerned, because
first of all, the US government never formally declared war on Vietnam, and secondly U.S.
soldiers were increasingly unwilling to die or even fight in the war as it lost popular support
in later years.
30 Popular support is, in fact, another condition for a war to have lasting effects on
national cohesion. The most reliable producer of what Marvin and Ingle call “unanimous
victimage” (i.e. widespread popular consent for member sacrifice) is a credible enemy.23 WWII
was an ideal war because it offered enemies that were unambiguously worth killing and being
killed by. The pretext for war must also be seen as coming from the outside, so as to better
conceal the fact that the nation will benefit from its soldiers’ deaths. Again, Pearl Harbor
offered the US an ideal war situation, and Presidents have always made an effort to create the
impression that American military involvement is a reaction to a belligerent attack rather than
a preemptive move (e.g. the fictive Gulf of Tonkin missile attack in 1964 cited by Johnson
as his casus belli in Vietnam).
31 Fourth, there must be genuine uncertainty of the outcome, and the greater the uncertainty, the
greater the ritual magic and enduring effects of the outcome. The Revolutionary War, the Civil
War and WWII all share this feature. There was no certainty from the start that the American
rebels would succeed or that the Southern rebels wouldn’t. It is also plausible that Normandy
has had such an enduring power over the national imagination because its outcome was so
unsure at the time. Similarly, James Bradley’s account of the Battle of Iwo Jima in Flags of
Our Fathers lays special stress on the way in which the unexpectedly high losses caused “a
sickening anxiety” about the outcome of that operation.24 It took 23 days to secure the island,
far more than anyone predicted, and success was likely but far from guaranteed. Iwo Jima
was the only battle of the war where the losses of the victors outnumbered the losses of the
defenders.
32 Fifth, the outcome must be definite: victory or loss must be clear and borders re-consecrated
in order for time to begin again. The outcome itself is less important than its clarity. Even a
loss can have a tremendously unifying effect on a group (one thinks of the Alamo or Weimar
Germany). In contrast, an ambiguous outcome, such as that in Korea, cannot create a feeling
of national unity. This theory can help explain the memory hole into which the Korean War
disappeared in spite of its 36,574 dead and 103,284 American wounded.25
33 Finally, only another ritual can repair a failed ritual. It is interesting in this light to see how
the First Gulf War was offered by President Bush Sr. as an attempt to repair the failed ritual of
the Vietnam War, and how the war in Iraq was understood widely to be Bush Jr.’s attempt to
repair the ultimately failed ritual of the First Gulf War. Since popular elections are also social
rituals whose ritual agency can be compared to that of member sacrifice, it is important to see
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how Clinton’s election in 1992, on his promise of a “new covenant” with America, and more
recently, Obama’s election in 2008, were understood by many Americans as rituals that could
heal the divisions that have been plaguing America since the failure of the Vietnam War.26
Obama’s failure to bridge the gap between the left and right in the US (and what political
figure could?) has shown how quickly such hopes can evaporate.
34 In the past six decades, the only event that came even close to generating the kind of national
feeling Mario Cuomo describes having about WWII was the Sept. 11 attack. Yet the deaths at
the Twin Towers ultimately did not have the cohesive effect of the deaths of soldiers at Iwo
Jima. For one thing, as already mentioned, most victims of 9/11 were not willing sacrifices in
any possible sense of those words. Secondly, even the media sanctification of the firefighters
in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, which worked initially to position them like soldiers
and therefore like national heroes in their sacrifice, eventually wore off as revelations of
the sometimes less than heroic side of firefighters appeared in 2002. For example, William
Langewiesche’s American Ground: Unbuilding the World Trade Center (2002) took away
some of their saintly luster with his description of firefighters treating their own dead with
“elaborate flag-draped ceremonials” while adopting a callous “bag ‘em and tag ‘em” attitude
toward civilian dead.27 As a result, tensions arose in the weeks after the attacks between
firefighters and the civilian construction workers, who felt that the civilian dead were being
forgotten in the media hype about firefighters.
35 Perhaps the biggest reason for the lack of enduring solidarity as an effect of the Sept. 11 attacks
is the way the emotions of that day were channeled by the Bush administration into a strategy
of revenge that targeted what turned out to be an unrelated country and to have had very
ambiguous results. Iraq is no longer ruled by a unstable dictator, but the war has brought no
tangible benefits to the United States (though many private corporations have profited greatly),
and certainly no sense of national regeneration or rededication to a common cause. On the
contrary, the war in Iraq has left America heavily in debt and more polarized than ever.
36 Precisely because most wars America has waged have failed so utterly at producing any
kind of national solidarity, something that needs to be examined in this discussion of ritual
conditions and ritual agency is the question of what level this logic operates on. Clearly, it is
not the level of individual actors, since no American official would ever think of himself as
sending American soldiers to die in order to strengthen national cohesion.28 Even less is this
the logic of official state discourse or reasoning. In fact, the ignorance of individuals and states
of the advantages of war sacrifice as ritualized social glue is obvious from how often wars
are conducted ineptly, from a ritual point of view, robbing them of any efficacy whatsoever.
In any case, as Girard insists, and Marvin and Ingle concur, the real motives for the group-
member sacrifice must be unknown to the participants of the ritual.29 A war must seem to
be provoked by an external enemy and not sought out by the group. The sacrifice will not
work to generate group feeling and solidarity if there is any hint of recognition that the group
desired the sacrifice in any way. This split between the explicitly articulated and the tacit ritual
meaning of sacrificial violence is the reason why analysis of political speeches, documents,
and memos may not explain everything about a nation’s behavior. By definition, the collective
will and agency operates on a level that is not conscious or epistemologically available to
individuals. It is a level that is necessarily supra-individual even though individuals will have
their own sense of why they are doing something like enlisting in the military or visiting a
national memorial. At the same time, the collective meaning, agency and effects of such actions
and institutions will exist on a different plane of social reality than the meaning and effects of
individuals’ actions and how they perceive them.30
37 It is often said that wars are launched as a means of generating unity and distracting a civilian
population from domestic discord. This is the cynical commonplace that was made about
Clinton’s bombing of Serbia and Kosovo as well as Bush Sr.’s decision to attack Iraq in 1990.
Like many clichés, it may be partly true, and some wars do indeed create powerful feelings of
national solidarity, spawning institutions and commemoration practices that give the country
momentum for a while. Yet Marvin and Ingle’s theory of blood sacrifice and civil religion
suggests that this solidarity comes not from facing or defeating a common enemy, real or
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invented, but from the deaths of members/soldiers willing to die in the name of the nation.
In other words, the only kind of war that could possibly create real national renewal is one
that is so cataclysmic that it would cost not thousands, but hundreds of thousands, of lives.
If Americans realized that they cannot get national unity with military action on the cheap,
perhaps we might rethink our willingness, generation after generation, to believe that war can
offer any kind of desirable solution to international conflict. As H.W. Brands reminds us,
“during the past two hundred years no country has sent military forces into battle more often
than the United States.”31 If we understood better the mixed motivations that drive American
politicians to choose war as a foreign policy option, we might have a better chance at making
other choices. If we also understood better the powerful mechanisms at work in collective and
national identifications, we might become more adept at creating group solidarity by means
of elections and other popular democratic processes instead of so often looking for a quick fix
of regeneration through violence.
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29  See Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 7.
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duplex. With this notion Durkheim sought to account for how, “in so far as he belongs to society, the
individual transcends himself, both when he thinks and when he acts.” This “transcendent” level of
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be understood. See Durkheim, Elementary Forms, 29. In Victor Turner’s tri-part classification of the
meanings of a symbol or ritual, the “positional” level, which remains unconscious or hidden from
participants and refers to the symbol’s relationship to other symbols in a total ritual system, could also
be applied to this theory. See Victor Turner, The Forest of Symbols: Aspects of Ndembu Ritual (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1967), 50-52.
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